The Russian Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, has summarised his meetings with the Foreign Ministers of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) which has been held in Tianjin, China. These are important geopolitical discussions, with the SCO including full members Belarus, China, India, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Afghanistan and Mongolia are observers, while Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Cambodia, Egypt, Kuwait, Maldives, Myanmar, Nepal, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka and the UAE are dialogue partners.

In his summary, Lavrov commented on developing a Greater Eurasian Partnership, Ukraine, the Israel-Iran conflict, Palestine, Afghanistan, the upcoming SCO 2026-2035 Strategic Development Plan, Trumps’ new 100% secondary sanctions, Laos joining the SCO, several questions relating to Iran, NATO’s expansion into Asia, and comments concerning Taiwan.     

We prefix his comments as SL and our observations as RPA.

SL: “Colleagues, good afternoon. We have travelled extensively together and have now reached the final destination of our tour – the city of Tianjin, where the meeting of the SCO Council of Foreign Ministers has just concluded. This marked the culminating stage of preparations for the upcoming SCO Summit, which will likewise be held here in Tianjin in late August – early September of this year.”

RPA: The SCO summit will be attended by the Heads of State of SCO nations, including Russian President Putin. It will be held from August 31-September 1.  

SL: “All participants unanimously acknowledged the business-like, focused nature of our work. In this context, we attach particular significance to this morning’s meeting with President of the People’s Republic of China Xi Jinping, who shared his assessments of joint efforts under China’s chairmanship and his vision of the key tasks for the progressive development of our Organisation.

The discussion confirmed a shared understanding of the growing importance of the SCO’s collective potential in both regional and global affairs. Nuances in national approaches persist – this is inevitable – yet the prevailing trend towards further consolidation of the SCO and the enhancement of its role on the international stage is encouraging.

We affirmed that our common approach of strengthening the SCO as one of the central pillars of a more equitable, multipolar world order remains unchanged. This fully accounts for the representative composition of the Organisation’s participants we see today, as well as the considerable number of nations seeking to join the SCO’s work.”

RPA: Lavrov implying that further additions to the SCO membership could be made. If so, this is likely to include new members from Central Asia, the Middle East, and possibly North Africa. Laos has already been accepted as a new SCO member.   

SL: “The geographical scope of our structure spans a significant portion of the Eurasian continent. We noted that cooperation within our Organisation objectively contributes to the creation of an architecture of equal and indivisible security across Eurasia. We regard the Greater Eurasian Partnership, based on cooperation among existing multilateral associations in the region – first and foremost the SCO, the EAEU, the CIS, and ASEAN – as its socio-economic foundation. We also take into account China’s Belt and Road Initiative, including existing agreements between this project and the EAEU. Within the framework of this approach, readiness was reiterated to maintain close coordination of actions within the United Nations.”

RPA: There have been consistent discussions concerning the SCO and its collaboration and cooperation with other regional bodies as part of a proposed “Greater Eurasian Partnership”. While the West tends to view the SCO as a security bloc, it also includes other remits, including the promotion of trade. Here, the CIS and EAEU are obvious partners, and includes SCO dialogue partners Armenia, and Azerbaijan, while ASEAN includes Bahrain, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. China’s Belt & Road Initiative includes 150 countries.

While the Greater Eurasian Partnership is not a reality at present, it remains a long term strategic Russian vision and would also encompass the European Union.    

SL: “We reviewed progress in implementing the proposals to enhance the SCO’s activities approved at the 2024 summit. Preparations are nearing completion for draft agreements on establishing a ‘Universal Centre for Countering Challenges and Threats to Security’ in Tashkent and an Anti-Drug Centre in Dushanbe. A structure to combat organised crime is planned for deployment in Bishkek.

We expressed support for further expanding the SCO’s engagement with external actors. A new step in this direction will be the upcoming high-level meetings in the SCO+ format at the Tianjin Summit – the first of its kind. This event will immediately precede the meeting of the Council of Heads of State on September 1, 2025.

We anticipate the participation of representatives from approximately 30 states and multilateral organisations in this event. This underscores the SCO’s growing constructive agenda and its appeal to nations of the Global South and the World Majority.”

RPA: Participants in the proposed SCO+ have not yet been revealed. They are however likely to include all current SCO observers and dialogue partners we listed above, in addition to other interested parties. Lavrov’s reference to the Global South is of particular interest in this regard.

SL: “Today, we held in-depth discussions on pressing international and regional issues. We provided our colleagues with detailed assessments of the latest developments in Ukraine and reaffirmed our well-known approaches to resolving the crisis, repeatedly articulated by President of Russia Vladimir Putin.

In turn, our partners demonstrated an understanding of these positions. Once again, we emphasised the necessity of addressing the root causes of the conflict, recognising the existing territorial realities, and guaranteeing the legitimate rights of Russians and Russian speakers, including in the areas still controlled by the Kiev regime.”

RPA: Lavrov signalling that the SCO Foreign Ministers understand the Russian position. 

SL: “We also unanimously condemned Israel’s attacks on civilian infrastructure in Iran. Let me remind you that on June 14, immediately after these aggressive attacks, the SCO promptly released a statement. Similarly, the US strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities were qualified as blatant violations of the UN Charter and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. We also reaffirmed our commitment to safeguarding Tehran’s legitimate right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy.”

RPA: Iran is an SCO member and took part in substantial bilateral discussions in its own right during the SCO meetings. Tehran is also supported by neighbouring Pakistan and counts China as well as most of the SCO member states as strategic allies.

SL: “Regarding the developments in the Middle East, it was noted that sustainable stabilisation in the region is impossible without a just and comprehensive resolution of the Palestinian–Israeli conflict, strictly in line with the UN decisions. As an urgent measure, all participants called for the immediate cessation of actions that further exacerbate the humanitarian catastrophe facing the Palestinian people.”

RPA: The damage caused to Israel’s foreign relations as concerns its handling of the Palestinian issue will be extremely difficult – and complex – to resolve, if ever. It appears apparent that without the support of the United States and Europe, Israel would be a failed state.

SL: “We also discussed ways to strengthen regional security, with particular focus on Afghanistan. Nearly all SCO member states are actively deepening their bilateral relations with Kabul. We share a common understanding of the importance of supporting Afghanistan’s reconstruction and ensuring its sustainable development as an independent, neutral, and peaceful state, free from terrorism and drug trafficking. It was underscored that fostering a process of national consensus and ensuring ethnic and political inclusivity in government structures remain key priorities.”

RPA: Lavrov is referencing Moscow’s recent decision to recognise the Taliban as the recognised government of Afghanistan and is asking SCO members consider doing the same. 

SL: “In addition, we reviewed the progress in preparing key documents to be presented at the upcoming leaders’ summit. As per tradition, our approaches to cooperation within the SCO and coordinated stances on current global and regional issues will be reflected in the Tianjin Declaration.

The long-term vision for the SCO’s evolution was also discussed. These strategic guidelines, building on the accumulated experience of the ongoing upgrading, will be enshrined in the SCO Development Strategy through 2035. The current ten-year strategy, adopted at the 2015 Ufa summit, will conclude in 2025.” 

RPA: The SCO Development Strategy 2026-2035 will be a thought-provoking document and will be finalised after the Heads of State summit. We will feature its contents and provide analysis when it is released.   

Question: What is your perspective on the “new plan” proposed by US President Donald Trump concerning Ukraine? Is Russia willing to continue dialogue with the United States on the Ukrainian settlement and bilateral normalisation following Washington’s recent declarations? How do we evaluate the threat of 100% tariffs being imposed on our trading partners in terms of Russia’s foreign economic interests?

SL: “We never pursue policies that harm our national interests or compromise the security of our nation. The special military operation is precisely aimed at decisively removing the threats that NATO has been systematically constructing directly on our borders – not for a day, nor a year, but for decades. Russia has issued repeated warnings. President Vladimir Putin has devoted numerous speeches and statements to this issue. Regrettably, he was not heeded. This only corroborates what President Putin recently recounted in his interview with Pavel Zarubin regarding how his – and our collective – perception of relations with the West has evolved. Initially, it appeared that removing ideological differences would be sufficient for improvement. Later, it became evident that ideology was not the issue – the West (irrespective of whether the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, or post-Soviet Russia was concerned) has been driven by one objective alone: the geopolitical containment, suppression, or even outright military destruction of Russia, as history has witnessed more than once. As Presidential Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov noted, we genuinely seek to comprehend what underlies this “50-day” declaration – previously, there was discourse of “24 hours,” then “100 days.”

We want to understand US President Trump’s motivations. Clearly, he faces immense – I would even say, improper – pressure from the European Union and NATO’s current leadership, who brazenly endorse Vladimir Zelensky’s demands to continue arming his regime with modern, including offensive, weaponry, all at growing expense to Western taxpayers. There is a Russian proverb: “Do not dig a pit for others.” The sanctions recently imposed by the EU – and those being prepared anew in Brussels – are now attempting to drag the United States into this “sanctions vortex.” Yet President Trump explicitly stated that Europe would bear the cost of prolonging the conflict. All this has already inflicted severe damage on the European economy. Objective European analysts, economists, and political scientists concede that the primary casualty of this sanctions war is its very architect. An unprecedented volume of sanctions has been levied against us. We are managing. I have no doubt we will prevail – a conclusion supported by independent assessments and analyses, including those from many Western economists and policymakers.

As for our trade counterparties, they can hear what has been said. But they can hardly predict their actions now. They have their international obligations. Knowledgeable of our partners, I cannot see how they can give up their independent policy, the policy of observing agreements achieved both through two-way channels and under multilateral formats.”

RPA: We have noted separately that US Senator Lindsay Graham, the architect of the proposed 500% secondary sanctions, earlier this week issued statements that singled out China, India and Brazil (all BRICS members, with China and India also full SCO members), as ‘despicable’ for continuing to trade with Russia. We also note that in terms of international dollars, the GDP purchasing power of these three countries is currently US$60 trillion, just over double the US purchasing power of US$29 trillion. While Lavrov has been coy about any tariff responses, the issue will certainly have been discussed between Lavrov and the respective SCO ministers. His opinion appears to be that they will not drop trade with Russia. A significant motivation not to do so is that their economies are currently doing well and are effectively powered by Russia-sourced energy imports.      

Question: Could you share the details of your meeting with Xi Jinping, what kind of message you conveyed to him from President Vladimir Putin? What other states are interested at the moment to join the SCO? Which of its initiatives could turn useful for reducing the risks of geopolitical crises sprawl?

SL: “As for the conversation between the SCO ministers of foreign affairs with President of China Xi Jinping and the following conversation with Russian delegation, we discussed the principled matters of developing the SCO and the initiatives of the Chinese chairmanship, which are already well known. At the bilateral meeting we discussed our coordination in the foreign policy area in conformity with the principled strategic reference points agreed earlier by President of Russia Vladimir Putin and President Xi Jinping. As you should understand, we will not go into details now.

As for those wishing to join the SCO, it was decided to grant SCO partner status to Laos. Most of the countries that want to join the Organisation will participate in a new format, which will appear on September 1, right after the SCO summit. This format is called SCO+. It will comprise about 30 countries and multilateral organisations.”

RPA: Lavrov confirms that Laos (a member of ASEAN) has joined the SCO. 

Question: On July 15, on the sidelines of the SCO Summit, you held a meeting with Foreign Minister of Iran Abbas Araghchi. Did you discuss Russia’s proposal to take excess enriched uranium out from Iran and practical steps to implement this proposal?

SL: “We discussed realistic approaches to ensuring a solution which would be achieved through peaceful, political, and diplomatic efforts with due respect of the decisions that the Islamic Republic of Iran had made a long time ago, namely the official renunciation by Tehran of possessing nuclear weapons. No evidence to the contrary has ever been presented by anyone, including IAEA inspectors.

The second important principle is not to infringe on Iran’s lawful rights, like those of all other non-nuclear members of the IAEA and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, regarding uranium enrichment for energy purposes. We will continue to discuss with our friends the specific possible steps in this regard, and available technical and negotiating opportunities.”

RPA: Lavrov alludes here to the SCO possibly providing nuclear technical support to Iran. There have been reports elsewhere that Pakistan was prepared to provide Iran with nuclear weapons to defend itself which would render the current state of affairs with Israel and the United States irrelevant. It has been noted that North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons has helped protect the country from US aggression.     

Question: Was there any discussion at the SCO or during bilateral meetings about providing practical assistance to Iran in restoring infrastructure destroyed by Israeli-American air strikes?

SL: “The Iranian side did not make such requests.”

Question: You mentioned that Moscow was trying to understand where US President Trump’s statements were coming from. Just before Trump, US Senator Lindsey Graham stated in about the same language that Brazil, China, and India were playing into Putin’s hands. You’ve made it clear that Moscow has no particular concerns regarding its partners, but I’d like to ask you if there is any potential for joint action by the SCO or BRICS regarding this threat.

SL: “Washington kept uttering specific threats targeting BRICS to the effect that BRICS needs to be opposed and that it undermines US interests. However, US President Trump has expressed a somewhat different view on earlier occasions. He stated that the actions taken by the Biden administration, which weaponised the US dollar, have irreparably damaged the standing of this global reserve currency.

I’m sure he understands that this is a fair assessment and that in response to the mayhem caused by the previous administration, BRICS, the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, and many other associations are considering alternative payment methods that do not include the US dollar and are thus immune to Washington’s behaviour.

This process can no longer be stopped. There are statistics that show the share of the US dollar in global trade and international financial transactions. This is not because we wanted to flee from the US dollar. President Putin has underscored this point many times. The US dollar was used to punish those whose behaviour – as seen by the Americans – was inconsistent with the infamous “rules” which they want to use as a foundation for the world order.

On a serious note, our diplomatic profession is not to fear things, but to push for proper consideration of Russia’s interests, and to work openly and honestly based on international law and the agreed-upon principles. A strong and independent country with a sense of dignity cannot behave otherwise. We have every reason to believe that the BRICS countries are also sovereign entities and appreciate their standing within the global system.”

Question: American media outlets claim that the United States is currently pressuring its allies in Japan and Australia to determine how they will assist Taiwan in the event of a conflict. Simultaneously, the US and its allies – 18 nations – are launching the largest-ever military exercises in Australia, involving tens of thousands of troops. What, in your view, is driving this latest escalation of tensions in the region?

SL: “This is not a new escalation. It may represent a new phase of the very same escalation that began quite some years ago, when the United States of America introduced the concept of developing and implementing Indo-Pacific strategies. By this, they mean the Asia-Pacific region – a term that has always been used without any inherent disadvantage.

The Indo-Pacific strategies symbolise NATO countries’ ambitions to extend their infrastructure into the Far East, Southeast Asia, and Northeast Asia, forging alliances with a nuclear core, such as AUKUS (the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia) and the trilateral partnership between the United States, South Korea, and Japan. These alliances are conducting increasingly large-scale exercises, including nuclear components, among many others. The US-backed Indo-Pacific Quad incorporates New Zealand, Australia, Japan, and South Korea. All this is accompanied by the eastward expansion of NATO infrastructure – even in dangerous forms, such as supplying the Philippines with ground-based intermediate and shorter-range missiles, previously prohibited under the US-Russia treaty.

This highly advanced weaponry will appear in Southeast Asia for the first time. Similar deployments are advancing into Europe, including Germany. Thus, the entire process reflects NATO’s aggressive eastward push. They sought to absorb Ukraine, stumbled, but persist in pretending they will inevitably achieve their goal. Concurrently, as they exploit Ukraine as a spearhead of their increasingly ineffective strikes against Russia, they are likewise advancing eastward. Their objective is to impose NATO-centric control over the security landscape across the entire Eurasian continent – eschewing constructive alternatives for an open, equitable security architecture that includes all continental nations of Eurasia without exception. Such a framework is championed by Russia, the People’s Republic of China, and our allies and like-minded partners.

Regarding Taiwan, you are aware that speculation and provocations on the Taiwan issue are proliferating. For instance, a journalist recently drew French President Emmanuel Macron into this logic by declaring that NATO would not interfere in Asian affairs if China ensured the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea did not meddle in Europe. How does that sound? The same Macron suggested that if Russia were permitted to seize control of part of Ukraine, what might happen to Taiwan? This is an overtly provocative statement. The West continues to assure the People’s Republic of China that it adheres to the One China principle yet immediately qualifies this by asserting the status quo must remain untouched. The status quo in practice means the West engages with Taiwan as an independent state, arms it, and emphatically underscores the trappings of its sovereignty.”

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